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In responding to my article (Henman, 2014), 
Quinn (2014) raises the question of development 
in science and scientifi c method. He picks up on 
the topic of the last section of my paper, and sug-
gests that “generalized empirical method” will be 
“coherent with the essential dynamics of scientif-
ic progress.” He points out that, if implemented, 
such an extended method “promises to be a way 
toward new and practical results” (Quinn, 2014). 
I happen to agree with Quinn.  As a nudge 
toward realizing the potential of such an ex-
tended empirical method, it may be helpful to 
connect these comments with an example from 
contemporary neuroscience. Quinn’s back-
ground includes mathematics, so I thought 
it might interest him and potential readers if 
I called attention to a recent result about neu-
ral activity in those who enjoy mathematics.
“Results showed that the experience of math-
ematical beauty correlates parametrically with 
activity in the same part of the emotional brain, 
namely field A1 of the medial orbito-frontal cor-
tex (mOFC), as the experience of beauty derived 
from other sources.” (Semir Zekil et al, 2014, p.1).
In its most elementary form, generalized em-
pirical method asks that the scientist appeal to 
all available data. That sounds simple enough, 
and it would be diffi cult to deny the impor-
tance of such a precept. What, though, are the 
data? Part of the challenge in the contempo-
rary context is that there are diverse sources of 
data - in biophysics, biochemistry, and so on. 
Indeed, one must look to sensitive conscious-
ness, for even data of functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging can be identifi ed as data of sense 
within the sensitive psyche of the investiga-
tor. But, also part of the investigator’s experi-
ence is the understanding attained, the under-
standing reached by attending to data of sense.
In one respect, this is not new, but is a re-
statement in the modern context of observa-
tions made by both Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas, by adverting to their own thinking: 
“The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms 
in the images” (Aristotle); and “it is impos-
sible for our intellect to understand anything 
except by turning to the phantasms” (Aquinas).
But, in the modern context, what precise-
ly are the images needed by the investigator? 
And, what are the thinking and understandings 
reached? A biophysicist can reach an under-
standing of data of sense obtained through func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging techniques. 
But, the biochemist reaches an understanding 
of rather different data, thus revealing not bio-
physical correlates, but biochemical correlates 
of human brain function. And what of the data 
that is the researcher’s experience of observ-
ing, inquiring and understanding data, and 
even appreciating that understanding? The re-
sults of Semir Zekil et al. (2014) confi rm that 
all sources here are relevant to reaching a bal-
anced understanding of human brain function.
Therefore, in partial answer to Quinn’s rhe-
torical question, the “need” is evident, that is, 
the need of an extended method that allows us 
to begin to integrate these layerings of data and 
understandings in the complexity of contempo-
rary results. What, for example, will be fMRI 
correlates of one who not only appreciates math-
ematics, but appreciates the complex biochemi-
cal unity that is a whole person who understands 
mathematics? Or, within neuroscience itself, 
what are the fMRI results for one who appreci-
ates an understanding of the magnetic imaging? 
As Quinn implies, going beyond such elemen-
tary observations will, no doubt, take quite some 
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